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We prove the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium of an iv-person 
nonzero sum linear-quadratic differential game with bounded controllers. Due 
to the method employed, the computational method of [4, Section 51 can be 
used to approximate the equilibrium costs. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The dynamics of the differential game to be considered are given by the 
following differential system in Rm: 
f = A(t) x + f B,(t) ui @cl < t < To). (1.1) 
i=l 
An initial condition is given by 
x(to) = x0 . (1.2) 
A(t) is a continuous (WZ x m) matrix on [t,, , T,,], and the I&(t) are continuous 
(m x qi) matrices on [to , TO]. Admissible controls us are Lebesque-measur- 
able functions which almost everywhere on [t,, , TO] are valued in U, , the 
unit ball in the Euclidean space Ri. We now define N cost functionals of 
“quadratic type”: 
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G(t) #)I) dt 
V-3) 
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Here (,) denotes inner product, and / 1 is the appropriate Euclidean norm, 
depending on i. The Ei are vectors in Ri; zi(t) are continuous functions on 
[to, TO]; all matrices in (1.3) are continuous on [to, T,,], while Wi is constant; 
and we also assume Wi and Qi(t) are symmetric. 
In [5] the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium was proven, in the 
absence of restraints, for a general class of differential games. See also [I, 
Section 8.41. Lukes and Russel in [3] studied linear-quadratic games in the 
unconstrained case. 
In this paper we will prove the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium 
point for the above game called G; that is, admissible (restrained) controls 
(u; , % ,..., c~) such that 
j& ) u; )..., i&) < J&z1 , ifi2 ,. . .) uigl , ui ) zli+l )..., u,) (1.4) 
for any admissible ui , (1 < i < N). We also will give a method for approx- 
imating the equilibrium costs Ji(z& , ~a ,..., Q), (1 < i < N). We will use a 
certain penalty function method which was introduced in [4] for approaching 
this problem; for a positive integer k, define N cost functionals by 
_Ti”(Ul 7 uz ,..., UN) = J&h , u2 ,..., UN) + jf; I ui(W dt. (1.5) 
Denote the differential game with costs given by (1.5) and where admissible 
controls ui need only satisfy $7 / Ui(t)12” dt < co by G, . The proof that G, 
has an open-loop Nash equilibrium (which yields a method for approximating 
the equilibrium costs of GJ is deferred until Section 3. In Section 2, the 
results of Section 3 are used to prove the existence of an open-loop Nash 
equilibrium for G, and it is proven that for large k, the equilibrium costs of 
Gk approximate those of G. The results of Sections 2 and 3 require a bound 
on T,, - t, . 
2. MAIN RESULTS 
Proof of the following result, as well as a computational method associated 
with its proof, will be dealt with in the next section. 
THEOREM 2.1. If To - to is sz@ciently small, then Gk has a unique open- 
loop Nash equilibrium. 
We will denote the bound required on T,, - t, by M and the equilibrium 
of Gk by (ur”, uZk,..., uNk). The following maps of Ri are now defined: 
if [ z1 [ < h-l/2”, 
otherwise. 
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The following payoff functionals are also defined for i = 1,2,. . . , N: 
l,6p(u1 , u2 ,*.*, UN) = Jib, , u2 ,.-.9 y&J> + jt)y4(‘)) dt. 
It is not difficult to see that 
1 Ji”(u, , u2 )...) UN) - J$(ul ) u2 )..., UN)/ < xy-3 
for any vector of controls (ul ,..., z+) which is feasible for G, . 
We will require the following lemma: 
(2.2) 
LEMMA 2.1. I f  T,, - t, < M, then 
max ““kP I s t” 1 z~“(t)1~” dt <Q < co. 
The proof of Lemma 2.1 is a computation employing Holder’s inequality. 
Details will be omitted. 
Let Uik be the set of vectors in Ri with Euclidean length < 1 - k-lizk, 
and let P&.) denote the Euclidean distance in Ri from Uile. Lemma 2.1 
implies 
s 
=0 
t0 d,k(Uik(t)) dt < + s (2.3) 
From Theorem 2.1 and (2.2), we have for any ui feasible in G, 
J&q, u;,..., uNk) < J$(uik, uzk ,..., uFP1 I ui 7 ui”+1 ,..., uNk) + LoTA (2.4) 
for 1 < i < N and each positive integer k. 
Let Gk denote the game with the same costs as G, namely (1.3), where 
admissible controls are Lebesgue-measurable functions Ui which almost 
everywhere on [to, To] take values in Uih’, the ball of radius k-llzk in Ri. 
We now prove 
LEMMA 2.2. Let To - to < M. Then there exists a constant D > 0 such 
that the following is true: For each positive integer k there is a vector of controls 
(a,“, aZk,..., 6,“) feasible for ek such that 
J@,“, z2,L ,..., tiNk) < J&I:, 2i,L ,..., &I , ui , ziRl ,..., ziNk) 
+ D(k-l/2 + 1 _ k-l/Sk) + ?i$t 
(2.5) 
for any ui feasible for Gk , i = 1, 2 ,.,., N. 
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Proof. Let v  be an arbitrary vector in Ri, and let 
k 
V if AJ, 
gzz z 
k-‘/2” & 
otherwise. 
Thus we have a single-valued mapping “,,” of Ri onto lJix:. 
Now, let v(t) be any Lebesgue-measurable function valued in Ri. (This is 
equivalent to the components of v(t) being real-valued Lebesgue-measurable 
functions.) By a direct measure theoretic argument, we have that e(t) is also 
Lebesgue-measurable. 
By a routine calculation (additional details are in [4]), we now have that 
(2.5) holds; (2.3) is made use of here. 
We now can prove the following result: 
THEOREM 2.2. If TO - t, ,( M, then G has an open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. In view of the fact that (ui*> is a bounded sequence in the space of 
square-integrable controls, i = 1, 2,..., N, there is a sequence k’ such that 
for each i 
zif 
, 
-3 ii, (weak convergence) (2.6) 
for a measurable control & valued almost everywhere in U; this last by the 
proof of Lemma 2.4.1 in [l]. Let P denote the trajectory corresponding to 
(zq’, zig,,..., ti$). By results in Section 2.4 in [l] we have f”’ --f x uniformly, 
where x is the trajectory corresponding to (u; , ii2 ,..., Ed). 
By [2, p. 2091 we have for i = 1, 2 ,..., N 
lirnmf 1 
=a 
to 
1 $‘(t)j2 dt > It; 1 zii(t)j2 dt. 
Using (2.5), the form of the Ji , the convergence of (&} and (2.7), the proof 
of the theorem is completed. 
3. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1 
By [l, Section 8.51 and also 131, we have that the second Gateaux differen- 
tials of the Ji are positive when T, - t, is sufficiently small. The condition 
409/46/z-7 
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of stationarity (that is, all the Ji having zero first Gateaux derivatives) is given 
by the following system of integral equations: 
224s) + 2k 1 Ui(S)y2 2$(s) 
= - l&“(s) @*(To ) s) W,[x(T,) - &] 
(3.1) 
+ l” k&*(s) @(t, s) Ci*(t) pi(t) [q(t) - x(t)] dt 
to 
for i = 1, 2 ,..., N. Here, * denotes the matrix transpose, and @ is the funda- 
mental solution of P = A(t) x. The symmetry of the Wi and f&(t) were used 
in the derivation of (3.1). A solution to (3.1) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium 
for G, . We rewrite the system (3.1) as follows: 
[Mt”(fG(t), M2”(uz(t)>Y.> ~N%v(tNl 
= Tk[Mlk(@)), Mz”(uz(t>)Yv ~Iv”hf(t))l. 
(3.2) 
Here, the Mik are maps of Ri into itself given by 
M&J) = 2v + 2k / a 1p-2 v. 
The ME are invertible, and the inverses are given by 
M;](w) 
2 + 2k[rky, w I)]““-” ’ 
where ~~(1 w I) is the unique real root of 2kx2”-l + 2x - 1 w 1 . Also, T, is an 
operator taking 
CO’l[to ) To] x C0s2[to ) To] x ..* x coqt, , To] 
into itself. Notice that the invertibility of the Mi implies that (3.1) can be 
expressed in the form (3.2). 
We now claim that each operator Ti, is a contraction when To - to < M. 
This is an analog of Theorem 4.2 in [4], and details are omitted here. A 
computational procedure for uniformly approximating the solution of (3.1), 
which avoids the difficulty that rk has no explicit form for k > 2, is given in 
Section 5 of [4] for N = 2, but easily generalizes to the present case. 
Since the sequences of numbers Ji(ziIlc,..., zi,“) are convergent, as can 
easily be verified, our computational method yields a procedure for approx- 
imating the equilibrium costs. Also, the (computable) controls (uIB,..., uNk) 
constitute an “approximate” open-loop Nash equilibrium of game 0 for 
large k, as can be seen from (2.5). 
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